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Pricing complementarities play a key role in determining the propagation of monetary dis-
turbances in sticky price models. We propose a procedure to infer the degree of ﬁrm-level pricing
complementarities in the context of a menu cost model of price adjustment using data on prices
and market shares at the level of individual varieties. We then apply this procedure by cali-
brating our model (in which pricing complementarities are based on decreasing returns to scale
at the variety level) using scanner data from a large grocery chain. Our data is consistent with
moderately strong levels of ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities, but they appear too weak to
generate much larger aggregate real eﬀects from nominal shocks than a model without these
pricing complementarities.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A central question in research on monetary business cycles is whether models based on nominal
rigidities can generate persistent delays in price adjustment and large output eﬀects from nominal
shocks despite the fact that prices of individual goods change fairly frequently, and both rise and
fall by large amounts.
Theories that reconcile the small extent of nominal rigidities at the level of individual goods
with slow price adjustment in the aggregate, are typically based on the presence of real rigidities or
pricing complementarities, which reduce any individual ﬁrm’s willingness to respond to a nominal
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1shock if it expects that some other ﬁrms don’t respond right away (Ball and Romer 1990). Pricing
complementarities may result from various features of the ﬁrms’ microeconomic and macroeconomic
environment, such as decreasing returns to scale, ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed factors, local or ﬁrm-speciﬁc
input markets, or variable mark-ups at the ﬁrm level, or input-output linkages across sectors or real
wage rigidities at the aggregate level. From a theoretical perspective, such pricing complementarities
can provide any arbitrary amount of ampliﬁcation and propagation from the micro level to aggregate
dynamics. Whether they are indeed large enough to provide enough ampliﬁcation is therefore largely
a quantitative question.
In this paper, we propose a procedure to infer the quantitative signiﬁcance of certain types of
pricing complementarities in the context of a menu cost model of price adjustment, using data on
prices and expenditure shares (or market shares) at the level of individual varieties.1 Our focus here
is on pricing complementarities that result at the ﬁrm level, in particular from decreasing returns
to scale or the presence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc inputs that lead to upwards-sloping marginal costs.2 The
parameters determining ﬁrm-level sources of pricing complementarities also determine how a ﬁrm’s
optimal pricing decisions interact with the ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic shocks. These parameters therefore
also have observable implications for prices and market shares of individual goods, so that at least
in principle they can be inferred from micro data. Aggregate sources of pricing complementarities,
on the contrary, do not directly aﬀect idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations of prices and market shares and
can therefore not be inferred from this data.
We then apply this procedure by calibrating our menu cost model to one particular data set
on prices and market shares, a scanner data from a large chain of supermarkets in the Chicago
area (Dominick’s), to assess the quantitative importance of pricing complementarities. Our cali-
bration results suggest that our inferred degree of ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities is too weak
to generate by itself a strong ampliﬁcation of nominal shocks at business cycle frequencies.
Our model, described in Section 2, introduces pricing complementarities into an otherwise
standard menu cost model (e.g. Golosov and Lucas 2006) by allowing for decreasing returns to
scale. We allow for idiosyncratic shocks to both cost and demand in order to match observed
ﬂuctuations in prices and market shares at the level of individual varieties.
In section 3, we discuss our inference strategy. Inferring the degree of pricing complementarities
1Throughout the paper, we focus on market shares, as opposed to physical quantities, as a simple way to isolate
ﬂuctuations at the individual variety level from ﬂuctuations at the sectoral level.
2We use this formulation for simplicity, and because this form of pricing complementarities is underlying a large
number of macroeconomic models with sticky prices (see, for example, Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde
2004, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2000, and Rotemberg and Woodford 1997).
2amounts to jointly inferring the elasticity of demand and the elasticity of the ﬁrm’s marginal cost
(i.e. the returns to scale parameter in our model). Basing this inference on data on comovements
in prices and market shares leads to a well-known identiﬁcation problem. In particular, four basic
moments characterizing the data on ﬂuctuations of prices and market shares (frequency and mag-
nitude of price changes, variability of changes in expenditure shares, and the correlation between
price and share changes) are not suﬃcient to calibrate ﬁve parameters of our model (elasticity of
demand, returns to scale, magnitude of cost and demand shocks, and size of menu costs).
To address this inference problem we add three moments to our calibration: the magnitude of
menu costs as a fraction of ﬁrm revenues, the average magnitude of price increases relative to price
cuts, and the sensitivity of the repricing frequency to the original level of prices.
This choice of additional moment targets is motivated by the following three observations about
our model, that we verify numerically. First, increasing the demand elasticity and decreasing the
returns to scale makes ﬁrm proﬁts more sensitive to mispricing and hence makes ﬁrms inclined to
change prices more frequently. By targeting a given frequency of price adjustment, we can therefore
determine the model parameters using existing measures of the resources that ﬁrms spend on price
changes as a reference on how large menu costs can be.
Second, ﬁrm proﬁts are more sensitive to mispricing when prices are too low rather than too
high. This implies that price increases in the model are more frequent than price decreases, but
they are also of smaller magnitude. Moreover, this asymmetry becomes larger as we raise the
demand elasticity and lower the returns to scale. We can then determine these two parameters by
matching separately the frequencies and magnitudes of price increases and decreases.
Finally, ﬁrms are more willing to adjust their prices when current market shares are above the
median. If cost shocks are the main source of idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations, this occurs when prices
are relatively low. If instead demand shocks are relatively more important, this occurs when prices
are relatively high. By comparing whether price changes are more or less likely when current prices
are high as opposed to low, we can thus infer the relative importance of cost and demand shocks.
This is important, because a correct inference of the degree of ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities
requires that we correctly account for the magnitude of cost and demand shocks.
In Sections 4-7, we apply these insights and calibrate the model to one particular data-set. Ide-
ally one would want to have this data for a comprehensive set of products in the overall economy, but
this information is hard to obtain. Instead, we use scanner data from a large chain of supermarkets
in the Chicago area. While limited in scope due to its narrow geographic coverage and particular
set of grocery products, this dataset has the advantage of providing high frequency information on
3both prices and quantities for many items within narrowly deﬁned product categories.
In Section 4, we report the summary statistics of the data at a monthly frequency to which
our model is calibrated. The reported frequencies and magnitudes of price changes are similar to
the ones documented by previous studies for a broader set of goods and services (Bils and Klenow,
2005; Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2005; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2007). We complement this with
moments on market share ﬂuctuations at the level of individual varieties, and with measures of
the asymmetries between price increases and decreases, and the sensitivity of the frequency of
price changes to the original level of prices and market shares. For our purposes, the following
observations are particularly relevant: (i) the variability of market share ﬂuctuations is fairly large,
both when prices are adjusted, and when they are held constant, (ii) ﬂuctuations in prices and
market shares are slightly negatively correlated, (iii) well over half of price changes are increases,
but they are on average smaller than price decreases, and (iv) prices are signiﬁcantly more likely
to change when market shares are above average, but the frequency of price adjustment is roughly
the same for original prices that are above and below average.
In Section 5, we calibrate our model to match these moments in steady state. Based on our
data, our inference strategy supports a demand elasticity of roughly 4 and, in its lower range, a
returns to scale parameter of 0.55,i m p l y i n gﬁrm-level pricing complementarities as high as 0.6 –
so that ﬁrms’ ideal prices increase by 0.6% when the aggregate price rises by 1%.3 If additionally
we assume a strong degree of aggregate pricing complementarities stemming, for example, from
real wage rigidities, the overall degree of pricing complementarities is as high as 0.80. To put these
numbers into perspective, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) calibrate the parameters of a Calvo
model to match the impulse response of an estimated VAR, and obtain pricing complementarities
of 0.87, with a similar degree of returns to scale, but a much higher demand elasticity.
In Section 6, we assess the aggregate implications of our inferred level of pricing complemen-
tarities. We do so by simulating the impulse response of our model economy to a one-time increase
in the growth rate of nominal spending, and computing the resulting cumulative output eﬀects.
For the range of parameters consistent with our data, pricing complementarities double the over-
all output eﬀects, but these eﬀects nevertheless remain an order of magnitude smaller than those
obtained with pricing complementarity values based on VAR estimates.
In Section 7, we show that our conclusions are robust along various dimensions, including
reasonable changes in calibration targets. Moreover, we explore the role of data on market shares by
3Our estimates are based on monthly frequency data, and hence cannot be directly compared to other estimates
of returns to scale based on lower frequency data, for example Basu and Fernald (1997).
4re-calibrating our model to only match observations about prices. Although we can no longer infer
all parameters, we still support our main conclusion that ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities are
at best moderate. Finally, we show that our inferred degree of ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities
do not change much, if, following Midrigan (2006), we calibrate a modiﬁed version of our model
that accounts for the occurrence of both small and very large price changes.
In summary, our calibration suggests that ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities that generate
quantitatively large aggregate ampliﬁcation eﬀects from nominal rigidities are inconsistent with
observations about our micro data. This is largely due to three reasons: First, by increasing the
curvature of proﬁts, stronger ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities give ﬁrms an incentive to change
prices much more frequently, so that matching the observed frequency of price changes and the large
variability of market shares (even when prices remain constant) requires implausibly large menu
costs. Second, a model with stronger pricing complementarities generate much more asymmetry
between price increases and decreases than what we observe in the data. Third, with a higher
demand elasticity, the observed size of price changes lead to market share ﬂuctuations that are
much larger than those observed in the data.
Our analysis relates to several literatures. Golosov and Lucas (2007) calibrate a menu cost
model to match empirical facts about price changes at the micro level, and then examine the
resulting aggregate implications of a nominal shock. Klenow and Willis (2006) introduce pricing
complementarities into this model by allowing for scale-dependent mark-ups. They show that if
such pricing complementarities are very strong, matching the price observations at the micro level
requires implausibly large cost shocks and very large menu costs. In contrast to these papers, we
calibrate our model to match facts on both prices and market shares — which requires augmenting
the model with idiosyncratic demand shocks. This is important since, in principle, the inferred
degree of pricing complementarities depends on correctly accounting for the relative importance of
cost and demand shocks.
Menu cost models with pricing complementarities at the sector or aggregate level also include
the work by Gertler and Leahy (2005) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2006). Gertler and Leahy
provide a theoretical foundation for a New Keynesian Phillips Curve based on a model with pricing
complementarities arising from sector-speciﬁc input markets. Nakamura and Steinsson calibrate
a model with pricing complementarities resulting from input-output linkages across sectors. In
contrast to our work, product level data on prices and market shares plays no role in inferring
those sectoral or aggregate pricing complementarities.
A large literature considers the plausibility of ampliﬁcation mechanisms that are based on
5pricing complementarities by calibrating or estimating rich macroeconomic models on aggregate
data (e.g., Altig et. al., 2005; Bergin and Feenstra, 2001; Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan, 2000;
Dotsey and King, 2006; Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2007; Kimball, 1995, Rotemberg and Woodford,
1997, among many others). We complement these studies by inferring the degree of some sources
of pricing complementarities using micro data.
Finally, in this paper we take a very simpliﬁed view of the ﬁrm’s price-setting problem, and
abstract from important characteristics of the micro data, such as inventories and stock-outs, price
promotions, a richer market structure and demand systems, and interactions between wholesalers
and retailers. Our goal in this paper is not to exhaustively explain all features of the micro data, but
to provide a methodology (and apply it for one particular model structure and dataset) to assess
the quantitative signiﬁcance of pricing complementarities in a tractable macroeconomic model.4
2 The Model
We now present a simple menu cost model of the representative sector (or product category) in
the aggregate economy. Time is discrete and inﬁnite. The representative sector is composed of a
continuum of varieties, indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Each variety is produced by a single monopolistic
ﬁrm. These varieties are purchased by a representative household, who values varieties according
to a Dixit-Stiglitz consumption aggregator.
Technology and Demand Structure: The demand for variety i is given by
yit = aitYt (pit/Pt)
−θ ,( 1 )





is the Dixit-Stiglitz price
index for aggregate output, pit denotes the price of variety i, ait is an idiosyncratic preference shock
for variety i in period t,a n dθ>1 is the demand elasticity parameter.
Each variety is produced by a single monopolist ﬁrm, using labor lit as an input, according to
yit = zitlα
it ,
where zit is an idiosyncratic cost shock for variety i in period t that shapes its productivity. The
parameter α ≤ 1 determines the returns to scale in production, corresponding to the presence of a
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factor that is costly to adjust at short horizons, or, similarly, to a ﬁrm-speciﬁc input
4Goldberg and Hellerstein (2006) and Nakamura (2006) consider pricing with nominal rigidities in richer structural
IO models that abstract from general equilibrium considerations.
6whose market price is increasing in ﬁrm scale. Firms’ nominal proﬁts in period t, exclusive of menu
costs, are given by
πit = pityit − Wt (yit/zit)
1/α ,
where Wt denotes the aggregate nominal wage in period t. The expenditure share (or market share)
of variety i in period t is given by eit = pityit/PtYt.
Idiosyncratic demand and cost shocks each follow an AR1 process,
lnait = ρa lnait−1 + εa
it














are iid across varieties and over time. We let Ψ(s0|s)
denote the transition probability function associated with the idiosyncratic shocks, where s =( a,z).
Price Adjustment: In each period, ﬁrms observe their draw of demand and cost shocks
sit =( ait,z it), and then decide whether to hire F units of labor to change their price or otherwise
keep it constant. The ﬁrms maximize the expected net present value of nominal proﬁts, discounted













where Ipit6=pit−1 is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1,i fpit 6= pit−1 and 0 otherwise.
Here, is denotes the nominal interest rate between period s and s +1 ,a n dπit denotes current
proﬁts exclusive of menu costs.
Nominal Spending, Wages, and Interest Rates: We summarize the considerations of
general equilibrium by a simple quantity equation that determines aggregate nominal spending, a
household Euler Equation that determines nominal interest rates, and an equation relating aggre-
gate nominal spending, wages and prices. Aggregate money supply Mt is exogenous and grows at
ar a t eµt. Aggregate nominal spending YtPt is equal to the aggregate money supply Mt. Interest
rates are determined by u0
t/Pt = β (1 + it)u0
t+1/Pt+1,w h e r eβ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, and u0
t
is the household’s marginal utility with respect to aggregate consumption (which equals aggregate
output in our model). Nominal wages Wt are determined as a geometric average of nominal spend-




t ,w h e r eγ ∈ [0,1). This reduced form formulation
allows us to capture several interesting special cases: If γ =0 , nominal wages move one for one with
nominal spending (or equivalently, real wages move one for one with aggregate output). This case
is the one considered in Golosov and Lucas (2007), and can be sustained as a general equilibrium
7outcome when preferences are logarithmic in consumption and linear in labor. Alternatively, in
the limit as γ converges to 1, nominal wages become less and less responsive to changes in nominal
spending, or equivalently, real wages move less and less with aggregate output (see, for example,
Blanchard and Gali 2006). The case with γ>0 also results from a model where ﬁrms use the
ﬁnal good as an intermediate input in production (see, for example, Basu 1995 and Nakamura and
Steinsson 2006a), or from additional curvature in the utility function (see, for example, Rotemberg
and Woodford 1997).
In this section and in our calibration, we focus on steady-state equilibria in which all aggregate
nominal variables grow at a constant rate µ. We then assess the impact of a nominal shock by
computing the transition path following a one-time increase in M. Our computation method is
described in the Appendix. Normalizing all nominal variables by the money supply, we deﬁne
ˆ Pt = Pt/Mt, ˆ pit = pit/Mt and ˆ Wt = Wt/Mt as the normalized prices and wages. In a steady-state
equilibrium, ˆ Pt = ˆ P, ˆ Wt = ˆ Pγ, Yt = ˆ P−1,a n d1+it =( 1+µ)/β are constant over time.
Optimal Pricing Decisions: Let V (ˆ p;s) denote the present value of proﬁts in a non-
stochastic steady state for a ﬁrm with current normalized price ˆ p (prior to its price adjustment
decision) and idiosyncratic state s. This value function is characterized by the following Bellman
equation:
V (ˆ p;s)=m a x
½











where p∗ (s) = argmaxˆ p V (ˆ p;s) is the ﬁrm’s optimal normalized price, and ˆ π (ˆ p;s) denotes the
ﬁrm’s normalized per-period proﬁt s .N o t i c et h a ti ft h eﬁrm does not adjust, its normalized price
depreciates by a factor 1+µ. After substituting for ˆ W,n o r m a l i z e dp r o ﬁts are given by
ˆ π(ˆ p;s)=a
³





ˆ p/ ˆ P
´−θ/α
.
The ﬁrm’s optimal decision rule ˜ p(ˆ p;s) is characterized by two values p(s), ¯ p(s) around the




= V (¯ p(s);s)=V ∗ (s)− ˆ WF.T h eﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal




, and to adjust its price to p∗ (s) otherwise.
A steady-state equilibrium consists of a decision rule ˜ p(ˆ p;s) that solves the ﬁrms’ optimization
problem, a cross-sectional distribution Φ over price-state pairs (ˆ p;s) that is stationary under the




With positive menu costs, ˜ p(ˆ p;s) does not have a simple analytical solution, and thus must
be numerically solved for. In the remainder of this section, in order to develop some intuition, we
focus on optimal pricing for a ﬁrm that faces no menu costs.
8Pricing Complementarities: Let ˆ pf (s) denote the optimal normalized price for a ﬁrm
whose menu cost is permanently equal to zero. This optimal price solves the ﬁrst-order condi-
tion πp (ˆ p;s)=0 ,w h i c hg i v e s








+ klog ˆ P −
1
α + θ(1 − α)
(logz − (1 − α)loga) ,( 2 )
where
k =1− (1 − αγ)/(α + θ − αθ).
The constant in (2) measures the logarithm of the mark-up over marginal cost. The parameter
k is the elasticity of the ﬁrm’s optimal price with respect to the aggregate price level ˆ P,a n di s
thus referred to as the degree of pricing complementarities. Note that k>0 reduces the ﬁrm’s
willingness to respond to a nominal shock if it expects that some other ﬁrms won’t respond right
away. In this sense, k>0 plays a key role in inducing a slow response of the aggregate price level
to a nominal shock.
The aggregate price level ˆ P aﬀects the ﬁrms’ marginal cost (and hence the optimal price)
through two channels. On the one hand, if marginal cost is upward-sloping (α<1), an increase in
ˆ P lowers the ﬁrm’s relative price, thus increasing demand and marginal cost. On the other hand,
if γ>0,a ni n c r e a s ei n ˆ P raises nominal wages. We refer to the ﬁrst channel as ﬁrm-level pricing
complementarities, and the second channel as aggregate pricing complementarities. Our model
abstracts from interactions between the aggregate price and the ﬁrms’ ideal mark-up.
These two channels are captured by the comparative statics of k with respect to the wage
adjustment parameter γ, the returns to scale parameter α, and the demand elasticity θ.W i t h
constant returns to scale (α =1 ), k = γ, i.e. individual ﬁrms’ pricing decisions interact only
because the aggregate level of prices aﬀects wages. In contrast, with α<1, k is increasing in θ and
in γ. In addition, k is decreasing in α, if and only if 1 − γ>1/θ, i.e. when decreasing returns to
scale are relatively more important for overall pricing complementarities than real wage rigidities.5
Note that ∂k/∂γ is increasing in α, so stronger decreasing returns to scale weaken the eﬀect of
aggregate complementarities γ on the overall degree of pricing complementarities k (and similarly,
aggregate complementarities weaken or overturn the eﬀect of decreasing returns). The eﬀects of
aggregate and ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities can therefore not be easily disentangled, and
evaluating the eﬀects of either channel requires information about the other.
5If γ is suﬃciently high, k is increasing in α. For example, if γ =1 , prices will increase in response to an increase
in nominal spending when α<1 but not when α =1 .
9The parameters θ and α determine not only the degree of pricing complementarities k, but
also how prices and quantities of individual varieties respond to idiosyncratic demand and cost
shocks. Using (1) and (2), a lower α increases (decreases) the impact of demand shocks on prices
(quantities), and reduces the impact of cost shocks on both quantities and prices. We can therefore
attempt to infer these two parameters using observed variation in variety-level prices and quantities.
On the other hand, the response of prices and quantities to idiosyncratic shocks does not depend
on γ. Therefore, information on prices and quantities of individual varieties does not shed any light
on the value of γ in a steady-state with constant inﬂation. The parameter γ only aﬀects the
dynamics of prices and quantities out of steady-state level. Therefore, the micro data alone doesn’t
allow us to completely infer k. Our inference of θ and α nevertheless enables us to identify a range
estimate for k, based on plausible values for γ, or estimates based on aggregate data. Moreover,
knowing α and θ enables us to accurately assess the eﬀects of aggregate complementarities γ.
3 Inferring Pricing Complementarities
In this section, we discuss how we can infer the key parameters of the menu cost model using
moments of the micro data on prices and market shares. The points of our discussion are veriﬁed
numerically in our calibrations in Section 5.
While the elasticity θ and the returns to scale α are the parameters of most immediate interest,
the model has eight other parameters that we need to consider: the growth rate of nominal spending
µ, the discount rate β, the wage elasticity parameter γ,t h em e n uc o s tF, and the parameters (ρa,σa)
and (ρz,σz) that govern the stochastic processes of productivity and demand shocks. Among these
eight parameters, µ is set equal to the steady-state rate of inﬂation, β is chosen to target the steady-
state real interest rate, and γ remains unidentiﬁed, but doesn’t aﬀect our steady-state calibration
of the other parameters. To simplify our discussion, we also ﬁx ρa and ρz, and focus on the ﬁve
remaining parameters (F,σa,σz,θ,α).
The micro data on prices and market shares gives us information on (i) the frequency of price
adjustment, (ii) the average magnitude of price changes, (iii) the average variability of month-to-
month changes in market shares, and (iv) the correlation of changes in prices and shares.6 With
these four moments, we are still unable to identify the ﬁve parameters. If we leave aside the
ﬁxed cost F and the frequency of price adjustment, this amounts to the well-known problem of
6Whenever our model with normally distributed shocks matches the average magnitude of price or share changes,
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Figure 1: The identiﬁcation problem
separately identifying the elasticity of demand and marginal cost, and the magnitude of cost and
demand shocks, from observed prices and quantities.
In Figure 1, we illustrate this problem by showing how the same data on prices and market
shares may be the result of diﬀerent parameter pairs (θ,α) –t h eﬁgure refers to levels, but the
same logic applies to ﬂuctuations in prices and market shares. In the left panel, this is done with
a demand elasticity close to 1, and near constant returns, resulting in very weak ﬁrm-level pricing
complementarities. In the right panel, the same observations are ﬁtted by a more elastic demand
schedule, and decreasing returns to scale, and hence stronger ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities.
More generally, there is a continuum of values of θ and α that can ﬁt the same data, with each
combination resulting in very diﬀerent degrees of ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities.
We thus need to ﬁnd additional restrictions that will enable us to resolve the problem of inferring
θ and α. In the remainder of this section, we discuss three observations about the menu cost model
that enable us to do so.7
Observation 1: Holding constant the four benchmark moments, the inferred magnitude of
menu costs is increasing in the degree of ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities (increasing in θ and
decreasing in α).
7This approach complements alternative estimation procedures that that try to instrument for variation in cost
and demand.
Another alternative would be to directly look for more direct information regarding some parameters. For example,
θ and α also determine the ﬁrm’s proﬁt rates and mark-ups, and it might therefore seem tempting to calibrate our
model to match measures of mark-ups or proﬁts. Such an approach, however, would require us to take an explicit
stand on the unmodelled ﬁxed factors of production, how they are compensated, and how they are accounted for in
any measure of proﬁtr a t e s .
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Figure 2: Asymmetry in value function and Ss-bands
In the model, ﬁrm proﬁts become more concave in ˆ p,a sw el o w e rα and increase θ.F i r m st h u s
become more sensitive to mispricing, which tightens the Ss bands and provides an incentive to
adjust prices more frequently. Therefore, maintaining the same frequency of price changes requires
larger menu costs. We can therefore infer α and θ by targeting existing empirical measures of the
size of menu costs and the other four benchmark moments.
The next observation provides an alternative that enables us to infer α and θ using additional
information on variation in prices and market shares at the level of individual varieties.
Observation 2: Price changes become increasingly asymmetric with stronger ﬁrm-level pricing
complementarities (higher θ and lower α). Price increases become more frequent, but smaller in
size relative to price decreases.
In the model, having a price that is too low lowers the mark-up and reduces the proﬁtm a r g i n
until proﬁts eventually become negative. Having a price that is too high instead reduces the quantity
sold, but proﬁt margins are actually even higher than at the optimum. Proﬁts are therefore much
less sensitive to price, when price is above the optimum, than when it is below. This asymmetry
carries over to the ﬁrm’s value function, and hence its Ss bands, which are asymmetric around the
optimal price p∗: the lower Ss band is closer to the optimal price than the upper Ss band. This
is illustrated in Figure 2, which plots the ﬁrm’s value function for a particular realization of s,
and in Figure 3, which plots the Ss bands (projecting pairs
¡
a,z−1¢
into a single dimension on the
horizontal axis).
The asymmetry in the Ss bands in turn generates an asymmetry in the frequency and magnitude
of price increases and decreases. With no inﬂation, the ﬁrm hits its lower Ss band more frequently
than its upper Ss band, implying that it raises its price more often than it lowers it. On the other
12(a,z-1)
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Figure 3: Asymmetry between price increases and decreases
hand, when price increases occur, they tend to be of a smaller magnitude.8
Now, how does this asymmetry depend on θ and α?T h el o w e ri sα, the more marginal costs
respond to quantities, and the higher is θ,t h em o r et h eﬁrm’s mispricing aﬀects its quantity. If
prices are too low, the proﬁt margin is then further reduced by the increased quantity (and hence
the rise in marginal costs), whereas if prices are too high, the reduction in proﬁts resulting from
the lower quantity is mitigated by the fact that marginal costs are also reduced. Therefore, with
higher θ and lower α, the asymmetries in the proﬁt function and the Ss bands become even more
pronounced, which implies that the asymmetry between price increases and decreases also grows
(price increases become relatively more frequent but smaller in size than price decreases).
We can therefore infer θ and α by calibrating our model to match these asymmetries between
price increases and decreases. Trend inﬂation aﬀects the magnitude of these asymmetries, in par-
ticular the fraction of price changes that are increases, but not the fact that they become more
pronounced as k increases (θ increases, α decreases).
Related to the problem of inferring pricing complementarities is the problem of isolating the
relative importance of cost and demand shocks. To see this, note that if demand shocks are
relatively more important, large ﬂuctuations in prices at the variety level can only be accounted for
in the model by strong decreasing returns to scale. In contrast, if cost shocks are relatively more
important, these price ﬂuctuations can be accounted for even with constant returns to scale.
Our inference of pricing complementarities would therefore be biased if we just focused on one
source of idiosyncratic shocks. Instead, it is important that we consider a model with both cost and
8See Burstein (2006), Devereux and Siu (2007) and Ellingsen, Friberg and Hassler (2006) for a related discussion





Figure 4: Asymmetry between high and low relative prices
demand shocks, and try to isolate how much of the price and share ﬂuctuations are driven by each.
We do this by calibrating the model to all four benchmark moments, in particular the comovement
between ﬂuctuations in prices and market shares.
Our third observation provides an alternative for inferring whether price changes are mainly
driven by cost or demand shocks, without directly relying on the data on market shares.
Observation 3: Price changes are more likely to occur in periods with large sales (market
shares). If cost shocks are relatively more important, this occurs when the original price is low. If
demand shocks are relatively more important, this occurs when the original price is high.
Ceteris paribus, proﬁts are more sensitive to mispricing when a variety is in high demand. This
in turn leads to narrower Ss bands and a higher frequency of price changes in comparison to when
demand is low. If price changes are driven mostly by cost shocks, a variety is in high demand when
its price is low. In contrast, if price changes are driven mostly by demand shocks, a variety that is
in high demand also tends to have a high price.
Figure 4 illustrates diﬀerences in the width of the Ss bands, depending on whether idiosyncratic
shocks are to demand (left panel) or to costs (right panel). If cost shocks are relatively more
important, price changes are more frequent when the original price is relatively low. If demand
shocks are relatively more important, price changes are more frequent when the original price is
relatively high. Therefore, how the likelihood of a price change depends on the original price
provides information on the relative importance of cost vs. demand shocks.
This argument is based on the premise that price changes are indeed more likely when demand
is high. Therefore, we will also need to look at how the likelihood of price adjustment depends on
the current level of demand (or the current market share).
14In summary, the ﬁrst two observations allow us to infer θ and α, and therefore measure the
strength of pricing complementarities. All else equal, stronger pricing complementarities require
higher menu costs and generate more asymmetries between price increases and decreases. To cor-
rectly infer these parameters, we also need to infer the relative importance of cost and demand
shocks. These can inferred either from the benchmark moments (in particular the correlation be-
tween ﬂuctuations in prices and market shares), or using our third observation, from the sensitivity
of the repricing frequency to the level of the initial price.
4 Data on Prices and Market Shares
We now apply the ideas described above, designed to guide inference of the model’s parameters,
u s i n gas p e c i ﬁc dataset. This dataset measures retail sales by Dominick’s Finer Food, a large
supermarket chain with 86 stores in the Chicago area, and was prepared by the University of
Chicago’s Graduate School of Business in cooperation with Dominick’s. The product categories
included in this dataset include non-perishable food products (e.g. crackers), household supplies
(e.g. detergents), and hygienic products (e.g.: shampoo). While limited in scope due to its narrow
geographic coverage and particular set of grocery products, this dataset has the advantage of
providing high frequency information on both prices and quantities for many items within narrowly
deﬁned product categories.
It is a weekly store-level scanner data by universal product code (UPC), ranging between 1989
and 1997. For each UPC it includes weekly sales and retail prices. The dataset includes 29 product
categories (e.g.: beer, bottled juice, toothpaste, dish detergent) and more than 4500 UPCs (e.g.:
Crest mint 8.2 oz., Tropicana mango 46 oz). In mapping our model to the supermarket data, each
variety corresponds to an individual UPC within a product category. We conduct our analysis of
pricing at the chain level. Dominick’s follows a chain-wide pricing strategy, with some discretion
given to individual stores which results in prices not perfectly correlated across locations. Stores
are divided into high, medium, and low pricing zones, depending on the extent of local competition.
We only consider stores included in the middle-level pricing zone, which contains the largest number
of stores. We focus on market shares, as opposed to physical quantities, to isolate idiosyncratic
ﬂuctuations from ﬂuctuations at the level of the product category. In our baseline calculations in
the data and the model, a time period corresponds to a four week interval.
In the Appendix, we describe in detail how we construct summary statistics from this data.
We construct market shares as the ratio of sales of individual UPCs to total sales across all UPCs
15within its product category in each week. Similarly, we construct relative prices as the ratio of the
nominal price of individual UPCs to the aggregate price of its product category (product category
prices are constructed as share weighted averages). For each UPC we construct simple averages of
market shares and relative prices across stores and weeks within 4-week periods. For our statistics
on chain-wide prices, we measure the median price set by Dominick’s across stores for each UPC in
a given 4-week period — since price changes are almost, but not perfectly, correlated across stores,
using chain-wide average prices would deliver artiﬁcially high price ﬂexibility. We compute each
moment A-H described below for each UPC, and then compute a weighted average across all UPC’s
within each product category (using as weights the fraction of sales of each UPCs in total sales of
its product category during the total time span). We report each moment for the median product
category.
We separately report statistics either including or excluding temporary mark-downs. For our
benchmark calibration, we focus on the statistics that exclude temporary mark-downs. In Section
7, we discuss how our results change if we instead use the statistics that include them.
A. Frequency of Price Adjustment: The frequency of price adjustment for each UPC is
deﬁned as the fraction of observations with price changes, and the price duration is deﬁned as the
inverse of the frequency. Table 1, Row 1, shows that, for the median product category, the price
of the average UPC changes every roughly 4 four-week periods (this is equal to 1/0.25) excluding
temporary price markdowns, and 2.5 four-week periods including temporary price markdowns. In
the model calibration, we target a slightly higher average duration of 4.5 periods, in order to make
the results comparable to Golosov and Lucas (2007) and Midrigan (2006).
B. Magnitude of Price Changes: We focus on measures of the size of changes in prices
over time (and changes over time in the logarithm of market shares in the following subsections),
and we do not focus on diﬀerences in price levels (or levels of market shares) across varieties at a
point in time, because our model abstracts from permanent diﬀerences across varieties in quality,
size, characteristics, etc., that explain some of the price (and market share) diﬀerences across UPCs
observed in the data.
Table 1, Rows 2-4, reports three measures to document large changes in UPC prices. Row 2
displays the average magnitude of non-zero price changes. It is roughly 10% if we exclude temporary
price markdowns, and 13% otherwise. Row 3 displays the standard deviation of non-zero price
changes, roughly 15% excluding temporary price discounts and 19% if we include them. Row 4
displays the standard deviation of relative prices p (the nominal price of the UPC divided by the
nominal price of the product category). Note that here we do not exclude zero price level changes,
16as even in those cases the relative price might change if the aggregate product level price changes.
The standard deviation of relative price changes is 7% if we exclude temporary price markups and
9% if we include them.
The magnitude of price changes (as well as the magnitude of price increases relative to price
decreases described in F) that we observe in the Dominick’s supermarket dataset is very similar to
that reported in Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2006) for the overall
CPI in the US, and in Dhyne et. al. (2006) for the overall CPI in the Euro Area.
In our calibration, we target a 4-week average magnitude of nominal prices changes equal to
10%.
C. Magnitude of Share Changes: Table 1, Rows 5-7 reports the magnitudes and standard
deviations of changes in log-market shares – note that this is diﬀerent from the standard deviation
of the percentage point changes in market shares. The average magnitude of the changes in log
market shares is 17%, and the standard deviation is roughly 25%. The volatility of market shares
is only slightly lower if the standard deviation is computed across periods in which the price level
remains constant (Row 7 reports a standard deviation of 22% in this case). If we include temporary
price markdowns, log market shares are roughly 5% more volatile.
In the benchmark calibration of our model, we target a 4-week standard deviation of changes
in market shares equal to 25%.
D. Comovement of Prices and Share Changes: Table 1, Rows 8-11 report four statistics
that summarize the comovement between changes in prices and changes in market shares. Recall
that a model with only idiosyncratic cost shocks would imply a strongly negative correlation between
price and market share changes, and a model with only idiosyncratic demand shocks would imply
a strongly positive correlation (if α<1).
Row 8 displays the fraction of price changes in which price and market shares change in the same
direction (both either rise or fall). Note that the model with only idiosyncratic cost shocks would
imply that all price changes are accompanied with share changes in the opposite signs (provided
that prices are set along the elastic part of the demand schedule). For the median product category,
this ratio is roughly 45% if we exclude temporary price markdowns, and 40% if we include them.
Row 9 and 10 display the correlation between changes in price levels and market share changes
(row 10 conditions on observations with non-zero price changes). The correlation is roughly −0.1
if we exclude temporary price markdowns, and −0.2 if we include them.
Row 12 displays the correlation between changes in relative prices and market shares (including
zero price change observations). This correlation, which is computed aggregating the price and
17market share data across all stores, is roughly −0.2 if we exclude temporary price markdowns, and
−0.35 if we include them. These correlations are only slightly closer to zero if we condition on
nominal price adjustment.9
The fact that correlations between prices and market shares are far from −1, and that prices and
market shares frequently move in the same direction, suggest that our model requires idiosyncratic
demand shocks to account for the observed comovement in prices and market shares. In our
benchmark calibration, we target a correlation of price and share changes, conditional on nominal
price adjustment, of −0.20.10
E. Menu Costs: Our dataset does not contain information on the costs of changing prices,
either by Dominik’s or its suppliers. Levy et al. (1999) and Zbaracki et al. (2004) report that
ﬁrms devote between 0.4% and 0.7% of their revenues on average to price changes. Although these
n u m b e r sa r eb a s e do nas m a l ln u m b e ro fﬁrms and on time-use survey data, they are consistent
with the common sense notion that costs of price changes are very small compared to the overall
costs and revenues of a ﬁrm’s activities. In our benchmark calibration, we target average spending
on menu costs that are not much larger than 1% of steady-state revenues.
F. Price Increases vs. Decreases: Rows 13-14 reports the likelihood and size of price
increases relative to price decreases. Row 13 shows that for the median product category, roughly
60% of prices changes are price increases if we exclude temporary price markdowns, and 54% if
we include them, Row 14 shows that the size of price increases is smaller than the size of price
decreases (the ratio of the average magnitude of price increases relative to price decreases is roughly
0.85 if we exclude markdowns and 0.90 if we include them).
In pure accounting terms, the steady state inﬂation rate can be decomposed into the frequencies
and magnitudes of price increases and decreases. With the right steady state inﬂation rate, matching
one of these two moments automatically implies that we also match the other one. In our model,
9We also computed an alternative relative price (market share) measure, deﬁned as the ratio of the current price
(market share) of a UPC to the average price (market share) across periods for that UPC. The standard deviation
and correlation of these alternative measure of relative prices and market shares are very similar to those reported
in Table 1.
We also computed our statistics using physical quantities for each UPC, instead of using market shares. We ﬁnd
that quantities are slightly more volatile than market shares, and the correlation between prices and quantities is
slightly more negative than the correlation between prices and market shares.
10Note that increases in relative prices driven by temporary price markdowns of a ﬁrm’s competitor, if associated to
a rise in the quantity sold, would generate a negative comovement between relative prices and market shares. Hence,
accounting for the observed comovement between relative prices and market shares, which is far from −1,r e q u i r e s
additional sources of demand ﬂuctuation.
18the steady state inﬂation rate primarily impacts the fraction of price increases versus decreases,
with only minimal eﬀects on the relative magnitudes.11 In order for our results to be robust to
small variations in the steady state rate of inﬂation, we target the relative size of price increases
and decreases, rather than the relative frequencies.
G. High vs. Low Prices: Row 15 reports the frequency of price changes conditioning on
whether the price level is higher or lower than the median price for each individual UPC. We ﬁrst
compute the median price for each UPC. We then compute the frequency of price change separately
for periods in which prices are higher or lower than the median price. We then average each
frequency across UPC’s, and take the ratio of the high-price frequency to the low-price frequency.
We report the median ratio across product categories.
Row 15 shows that, excluding price promotions, the frequency of prices changes is roughly
independent on whether pre-change prices are low or high – the ratio of frequencies conditional on
prices being high versus low is roughly 0.95. If we include price promotions, prices are then slightly
less likely to change if the initial price levels is high.
H. High vs. Low Market Shares: Row 16 redoes the calculations in G, now conditioning on
high versus low initial market shares (instead of conditioning on high versus low price levels). We
follow the same steps as before, computing the median market share for each UPC, and separately
computing the frequency of price changes for periods in which the market share of a UPC is above
or below the median. The results in Row 16 suggest that prices are more likely to change in periods
when the market share is high (the ratio of frequencies is roughly 1.2).
Table 2 reports the statistics when we depart from the baseline calculations reported in Table
1a l o n gﬁve diﬀerent dimensions: (1) construct one-week time-periods (T =1 ) instead of four-week
time periods (T =4 ), (2) compute weighted averages of relative prices and market shares, instead
of simple averages across stores and weeks, (3) exclude UPCs/time periods with average market
shares lower than 1% (instead of 0.1% in the benchmark case), (4) use data for only one store per
product category (the one with the lowest number of missing observations for each product category)
instead of computing averages or medians across all middle-level pricing zone, and (5) construct
the statistics on price and market share changes using all individual store observations (instead
of computing a single chain-wide price and market share for each UPC). Overall, in terms of the
basic summary statistics of the data, these perturbations from the baseline computations generate
11Gagnon (2006) reports, using CPI data for Mexico, that changes in inﬂa t i o nh a v eal a r g ee ﬀect on the relative
frequencies of price increases and decreases, but not on the relative magnitudes.
19slightly lower frequencies of price adjustment, slightly larger price changes, more volatile market
shares, and correlations between prices and market shares that are closer to zero.12 Moreover,
there are only small changes in the magnitude of the asymmetries (both the size of positive relative
to negative price changes, and frequency of price adjustment conditional on high and low relative
prices).13
In Section 7 we perform sensitivity analysis in our model and argue that changes in the calibra-
tion targets in the direction suggested by these robustness checks have only a minor impact on the
inferred level of ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities. Moreover, the choice of targets (especially
the relatively small size of price and market share ﬂuctuations) biases our inference toward ﬁnding
higher levels of ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities.
5 Calibration Results: Steady-State
In this section, we report our steady-state calibration results. As in the data, we consider a period to
be 4 weeks. We set β =0 .995 to target an annual real interest rate of 6%,a n dµ =0 .0017 to match
an annual inﬂation rate of 2.2%, which is the price inﬂation that we measure in the Dominick’s
data for the median product category. Finally, we set the persistence parameters ρz = ρa =1 /2.
In Section 7, we present some sensitivity analysis regarding the persistence parameters.






,w eﬁx α at various levels between
0 and 1, and calibrate the other four parameters to match our four benchmark moments. We then
compare how well these diﬀerent calibrations match our secondary targets to determine what values
of α and θ are more plausible. To provide some intuition about our calibration targets, we ﬁrst
present results when only cost or demand shocks are present (σa =0or σz =0 ) ,a n dt h e nc o n s i d e r
the case when both shocks are active.
Single Shock Model: In Table 3, Columns 1-5, we report results for the model with cost
shocks only. In the absence of demand shocks, the correlation between prices and market shares
12To focus only on the largest UPCs, we also computed (but do not report in our tables) our summary statistics
considering within each period the the ten highest market share UPCs in each product category. This procedure
implies slightly larger average price changes, slightly less volatile market shares, and a correlation between relative
price and market share changes that is closer to 0.
13In related work, Dossche, Heylen and Dirk Van den Poel (2006) infer a relatively small degree of demand-based
pricing complementarities using a large scanner dataset of a European retailer. Their data, which covers a wide
variety of products such as clothing, equipment, and leisure goods, reveals a very high volatility of quantity changes,
as well as comovements between relative prices and quantitites that are signiﬁcantly larger than −1.
20is −1, as prices and quantities move along a ﬁxed demand schedule (Row 10). For diﬀerent values
of α, we then calibrate the other parameters to match the remaining three benchmark moments
(Rows 7-9). F and σz are adjusted to jointly match the frequency and magnitude of price changes.
The demand elasticity is then adjusted to match the variability of share changes. The case with
α =0 .99 (Column 1) roughly replicates the calibration results of Golosov and Lucas (2007), with
near constant returns to scale.
Table 3, Columns 6—9 report similar results for a model with demand shocks only. With fully
ﬂexible prices, such a model would imply that prices and shares are perfectly, positively correlated.
With menu costs, the correlation between prices and market shares need not be perfect, but remains
large and positive (Row 10). As before, we ﬁx α at diﬀerent levels, and adjust the remaining
parameters to match all the benchmark moments, except for the correlation (Rows 7-9). Note that
with only demand shocks, we are no longer able to match the magnitude and frequency of price
increases with near constant returns to scale (Column 6). Since prices respond very little to demand
shocks in this case, shocks must become very large to match the frequency and magnitudes of price
changes. But that in turn would generate implausibly large changes in market shares.
The results in Table 3 illustrate our three observations from the previous section. First, with
stronger decreasing returns, both menu costs and idiosyncratic shocks become larger. In the model
with cost shocks only and α =0 .35, the average menu cost represents as much as 5% of ﬁrm revenues
(Row 5), and cost shocks become as large as 25% month-to-month (Row 3). In the demand shock
model, this eﬀect is less pronounced, with the magnitude of idiosyncratic demand shocks rising
from 24% to 30% as α falls from 0.75 to 0.35 (Row 4), and the magnitude of menu costs rising to
0.9% of revenues (Row 5).
Second, lower values of α generate larger asymmetries between price increases and decreases.
With cost shocks only, the relative magnitude of price increases to price decreases drops from 0.94
to 0.8 as α drops to 0.35 (Row 11). With demand shocks only, price changes are less asymmet-
ric overall, but the same pattern emerges, with the magnitude of increases relative to decreases
dropping from 1.01 to 0.79 as we lower α (Row 11).
Third, the repricing probability depends positively on the level of demand, shaping the frequency
of price adjustment conditional on the price level. With cost shocks only, price changes are only
roughly 70% as likely to occur when relative prices are high than when they are low (Row 12), and
they are roughly 1.7 times as likely to occur when market shares are high rather than low (Row
13). With demand shocks only, price changes are about 1.2 times as likely to occur when prices are
high as opposed to low, and 1.4 t i m e sa sl i k e l yw h e ns h a r e sa r el a r g ea so p p o s e dt os m a l l .
21The results in Table 3 illustrate the importance of the nature of idiosyncratic shocks in our
inference of α and θ, and the resulting degree of pricing complementarities. The model with only
demand shocks is easier to reconcile with strong decreasing returns to scale than the model with
cost shocks only. In the latter, returns to scale can be at most moderately decreasing (α ≥ 0.75 ,
θ ≈ 6), for otherwise they would require implausibly large menu costs. The model with demand
shocks, instead, requires stronger decreasing returns (α ≤ 0.55 , θ ≈ 3)t oﬁt the targets of menu
costs and positive/negative price asymmetries. Of course, both of the extremes miss out on the
correlation between price and share movements (Row 10) and on the sensitivity of the repricing
frequency to the level of prices and demand (Rows 11 and 12), suggesting that both types of shocks
are required to match the data.
Model with Demand and Cost Shocks: In Table 4, we report our results for the model
with both demand and cost shocks. We ﬁx α at diﬀerent levels, and then determine the other four
parameters to match our four benchmark moments, including the price-share correlation.
For example, beginning with α =1 , we can match a slightly negative correlation by setting θ
fairly close to 1:i fα =1 , prices only respond to productivity shocks; θ ≈ 1 in turn implies that
price and share changes are completely orthogonal to each other. The parameters F, σz and σa are
then set to match, respectively, the average duration and average magnitude of price changes, and
the variability of share changes. Note that this parametrization implies extremely large mark-ups.
As we lower α,t h eﬁrms’ optimal prices respond also to demand shocks, which ceteris paribus
makes the correlation between prices and shares less negative. Moreover, ﬁrm proﬁts become
more sensitive to mispricing, which generates an incentive to have more frequent, but smaller price
adjustments. To compensate for this, we need to raise θ to reduce the correlation between prices
and shares, and increase F, σa and σz to maintain the same frequency and magnitude of price and
share changes (Rows 2-5).
In contrast to the model with only cost shocks, the shocks no longer appear to be implausibly
large given the ﬂuctuations we observe in the data. The 10% magnitude of cost shocks is similar
to the values used in other calibrations. In addition, this value is similar to the magnitudes of
changes in wholesale prices in the Dominick’s data.14 Our measure of the magnitude of demand
shocks is still large, which is expected given the fairly large variability in market shares. In the
presence of large demand shocks, the model generates a high variability of market shares even
14The Dominick’s data report the cost of acquisition of the current inventory, not the current replacement costs.
Whole-sale prices therefore provide a reliable proxy for costs only for items that have a fast turn-over rate, such as
certain refrigerated food items.
22when prices remain constant. In particular, and consistent with our data, the standard deviation
of market shares remains roughly equal to 25% when it is evaluated only across periods in which
prices remain constant.
How well do the diﬀerent calibrations do in terms of matching our secondary targets? Row 5
shows that a model with α in the range of 0.55 to 0.75 and θ in the range of 3.8 to 4.4 requires menu
costs that are roughly in line with existing empirical measures; lower values of α lead to extremely
large menu costs (up to almost 4% of revenue for α =0 .25).
The same range of α also reasonably accounts for the observed asymmetry between price in-
creases and price decreases: for α =0 .55, the ratio of the magnitude of price increases relative to
decreases is 0.86 (Row 11). Lower values of α lead to asymmetries between increases and decreases
that are too large, while higher values of α generate asymmetries that are too small.
Finally, throughout all calibrations, the adjustment probability when market shares are high is
roughly 20% larger than the probability of adjustment when market shares are low (Row 13), and
when prices are high, they are roughly 5% less likely to change than when they are low (Row 12).
Both of these values are close to the target, which conﬁrms that our parameterization successfully
matches the relative importance of cost and demand shocks. However, since these asymmetries are
roughly constant throughout all columns, they do not contribute much to the inferred degree of
pricing complementarities.
Implied Pricing Complementarities: The degree of pricing complementarities that is im-
p l i e db yt h e s ev a l u e so fα and θ depends on the assumed value of aggregate pricing complementari-
ties γ.W i t hγ =0 , our range estimate of α ∈ [0.55,0.75] and θ ∈ [3.8,4.4] leads to moderate pricing
complementarities k between 0.4 and 0.6. If we allow for strong aggregate pricing complementarities
by raising γ to 0.85,o u ri n f e r r e dl e v e lo fk is 0.79.
How do these parameter values compare with estimates of pricing complementarities that are
based on aggregate data? Existing aggregate estimates are obtained by selecting parameters to
match the theoretical impulse response function of a Calvo model to the impulse response of an
identiﬁed VAR in output and inﬂation, thus requiring the theoretical model to match the inferred
persistence of nominal shocks almost by construction. Moreover, this approach does not separately
identify the frequency of adjustment from the degree of pricing complementarities, and thus requires
an assumption about the former to make some inference about the latter. Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997) for example, assume an average price duration of three quarters, and in their model obtain
aggregate parameter estimates of γ =0 .84 and k =0 .87. The underlying structural parameters α
23and θ are then calibrated to α =0 .68 and θ =7 .9 to match labor market observations.15
Our inferred range of pricing complementarities is thus lower than those from aggregate esti-
mates, even if we allow for aggregate pricing complementarities. Relative to macro-based estimates,
our inferred returns to scale parameter is quite similar, but our inferred demand elasticity of roughly
4 is substantially smaller, and is more in line with existing estimates from the Industrial Organi-
zation literature, including for example, the results in Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003) that
made use of the same data. In the next section, we will explore the quantitative signiﬁcance of this
diﬀerence by examining the response of output to a change in money supply in our model. Given
that aggregate estimates are based on matching the inferred persistence of nominal shocks, this
appears to be the most direct way to compare our micro-based estimate with existing aggregate
numbers.
Why don’t the data support stronger ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities? First, with more
strongly decreasing returns and a higher demand elasticity, ﬁrms become more sensitive to mispric-
ing and want to change prices more frequently. Matching the observed duration and magnitude of
price changes, as well as the large variability of market share ﬂuctuations, even when prices remain
constant (these ﬂuctuations in market shares lead to large changes in marginal costs under strong
decreasing returns to scale), requires menu costs that are much higher than existing estimates. Sec-
ond, matching our benchmark moments, a model with stronger pricing complementarities generates
much more asymmetry between price increases and decreases than what we observe in the data.
Third, a higher demand elasticity would be inconsistent with the magnitude of observed price and
share ﬂuctuations. At higher values of θ, the observed price ﬂuctuations of 10% on average would
generate ﬂuctuation in market shares that are much larger than what the data suggest.
6 Aggregate Impulse Responses
We now use our inferred parameters to assess the eﬀects of a one-time increase in the growth of
nominal spending. Since our focus is on comparing the aggregate response of the model under
alternative parameterizations, we only consider a simple change in the path of the money supply
(and abstract, for example, from feedback eﬀects from output to monetary policy). Starting from
the steady-state distribution of normalized prices, we compute the transition path for prices and
output in response to an unexpected one-time 0.5% increase in M, followed by a return to the
15Notice that these numbers are based on a price duration that is twice as long as the one we found in our data.
Assuming a price duration of 4.5 months, the aggregate estimates would imply a much higher value of k ≈ 0.97.







































Figure 5: Impulse response of output to a 0.5% monetary shock
steady-state growth rate µ. Figure 5 and Table 5 report the results from this aggregate experiment.
We consider two values of α: roughly constant returns to scale (α =0 .95) and our ‘preferred
calibration’ with the highest level of ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities that can be supported by
our data (α =0 .55, θ =4 .4). The other parameters are set according to the calibrations in Table 4.
To explore the role of aggregate pricing complementarities we consider γ =0and γ =0 .85 (recall
that γ cannot be directly inferred from our calibration procedure). Column 3 in Table 5 displays
the resulting level of pricing complementarities k.
Figure 5 displays the 24-month impulse response of output to the aggregate shock. Columns
4 and 5 in Table 5 provide two measures to quantify this impulse response. Both measures are
normalized by the size of the shock. Column 4 reports the response of aggregate output Y on impact.
Below, we derive a simple analytic expression for this measure that can be easily interpreted within
the context of our model. Column 5 reports the Cumulative Impulse Response (CIR), which sums
over time the impulse response of aggregate output. This measure summarizes the cumulative
impact of the nominal spending shock on output at diﬀerent horizons (in particular, we report the
CIR for the ﬁrst 24 months after the shock), and therefore provides a more complete picture of
the real eﬀects from the shock.16 For example, if a shock increases output one-for-one on impact
16Our 24 month truncation is innocuous in the menu cost model, in which shocks are fully absorbed within this
period. In the Calvo model, which is used for comparison purposes, shocks are more long-lived, so our CIR is a
lower bound of the actual real eﬀects implied by the model. See Nakamura and Steinsson (2006) for a more detailed
25(∆lnY/∆lnM =1 ) and dies out at a linearly declining rate over a period of 24 months, the CIR
would be equal to 12.
Table 5: Response to Nominal Shock
α γ k ∆lnY
∆lnM CIR
0.95 0 0.06 0.32 0.41
0.55 0 0.60 0.54 1.23
0.95 0.85 0.82 0.72 2.23
0.55 0.85 0.79 0.69 2.34
Two observations stand out from the ﬁgure and table:
Result 1: With no aggregate pricing complementarities (γ =0 ), the inferred degree of pricing
complementarities k increases the output eﬀects of a nominal shock, but the overall eﬀect remains
small.
With constant returns to scale (α =0 .95), over two thirds of the nominal shock is absorbed by
prices on impact (and output only increases by 1/3), and the shock is fully absorbed into prices
after 4 months. Under our preferred calibration (α =0 .55) the increase in prices is reduced, but still
nearly half the eﬀect is absorbed by prices on impact (and output increases by roughly 1/2), and
the shock is fully absorbed into prices after 9 months. The CIR increases from 0.4 with constant
returns, to 1.2 under our preferred calibration.
To assess the magnitude of these eﬀects, Figure 5 displays the impulse response in a Calvo
version of our model using Rotemberg and Woodford’s (1997) parameter estimates of γ =0 .84,
θ =7 .9,a n dα =0 .68, together with an exogenous monthly adjustment frequency of 0.22 (matching
the frequency target of our data). The output response is signiﬁcantly larger and more persistent,
which can be summarized by a CIR of roughly 16. Thus, even though our preferred calibration
triples the CIR relative to the model without pricing complementarities, the overall real eﬀects in
the estimated Calvo model are roughly 13 times larger.
Result 2: Adding aggregate pricing complementarities does not lead to much stronger output
eﬀects within our inferred range of ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities
Under our preferred calibration with α =0 .55,i n c r e a s i n gγ from 0 to 0.85 raises k from 0.6 to
0.8. The output response on impact increases from 0.54 under γ =0to 0.69 under γ =0 .85,a n d
the CIR increases from 1.2 under γ =0to 2.3 under γ =0 .85. Adding aggregate complementarities
discussion of this measure.
26that roughly match Rotemberg and Woodford’s estimates almost double the dynamic output eﬀects,
but the eﬀects in the estimated Calvo model are still roughly 7 times larger.
As we had discussed above, stronger decreasing returns to scale weaken the eﬀect of aggregate
complementarities γ, and vice versa. In particular, increasing γ from 0 to 0.85 triples the CIR when
α =0 .95 but doubles the CIR when α =0 .55; likewise lowering α from 0.95 to 0.55 has much bigger
eﬀects when γ =0 , than when γ =0 .85. An accurate quantitative assessment of either channel of
complementarities therefore requires taking into account the potential contribution of the other.
Underlying both of these results is the fact that there is a strong extensive margin of price
adjustment in the menu cost model that is not present in a Calvo model (the so-called ‘selection
eﬀect’ that is emphasized in Golosov and Lucas, 2007, and Midrigan, 2006). In the Appendix, we





1 − (f + S)
1 − k(f + S)
,
where f denotes the frequency of price adjustment, and S the selection eﬀect. The frequency f
captures the intensive margin of price adjustment, or the fact that all the ﬁrms that do adjust
slightly increase their new target price after the shock has occurred. The selection eﬀect S captures
the extensive margin, or the fact that after the shock, some ﬁrms that would have kept their price
constant now prefer to raise it, and some other ﬁrms that would have reduced their price now prefer
to keep it constant.
We can compute both f and S from the steady-state distribution Φ. In the menu cost model,
S is roughly constant at 0.45 across our various parameterizations. It is equal to 0 in the Calvo
model. Therefore, with a monthly frequency of price adjustment f =0 .22 (so that the average
duration is 4.5=1 /0.22 months), our menu cost model has similar aggregate implications to a
Calvo model in which 67% of all ﬁrms change their prices every period.
To illustrate the importance of this selection eﬀect, we can use our decomposition for some
simple counterfactuals, which are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6: Counterfactuals
k 0 0.6 0.80 0.97
∆Y
∆M (S =0 .45) 0.33 0.55 0.71 0.95
∆Y
∆M (S =0 ) 0.78 0.90 0.95 > 0.99
Without pricing complementarities (k =0 ), the Calvo model (S =0 ) predicts an output
response on impact of 0.78, whereas the menu cost model (S =0 .45) predicts a response of 0.33.
27For the moderate ﬁrm-level complementarities that we infer from the data (k =0 .6), increasing S
from 0 to 0.45 reduces the output response on impact from 0.9 to 0.55. If additionally we introduce
aggregate pricing complementarities γ =0 .85 so that k =0 .8,i n c r e a s i n gS from 0 to 0.45 reduces
the output response on impact from 0.95 to 0.71. To obtain an output response of 0.95 on impact
with a selection eﬀect of S =0 .45, one would need extremely strong pricing complementarities
(k =0 .97).
We conclude from this discussion that a menu cost model can generate substantial output eﬀects
only if (i) there is a very large degree of pricing complementarities, and (ii) the selection eﬀect is
much smaller than what is suggested by our calibration. Pricing complementarities that are purely
driven by ﬁrm-level decreasing returns are unable, by themselves, to quantitatively account for
large output eﬀects. While allowing for large aggregate complementarities can increase k closer to
the Rotemberg-Woodford range, the total output response of nominal shock remains small in the
presence of a strong selection eﬀect.
7E x t e n s i o n s
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our inference of ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities
to plausible departures from our benchmark calibration targets. We also explore the role of the
quantity data for our inference, and we consider a modiﬁed version of our model that can account
for additional observations about prices.
Sensitivity Analysis: We perform simple sensitivity checks, recalibrating our model with dif-
ferent parameters or targets, to explore how sensitive our inferred level of pricing complementarities
are to the targets that we picked for our benchmark calibration. Results are reported in Tables 7.
We ﬁrst vary the annual steady-state inﬂation rate between 0 and 4%. This mainly aﬀects the
fraction of price changes that are increases, with little eﬀects on the other moments. This conﬁrms
our earlier argument for focusing on the relative magnitudes as the relevant target.
We then consider the eﬀects of lower and higher targets for the frequency of price changes
(Nakamura and Steinsson 2006b, for example, argue for a longer average duration of prices). When
we raise the average duration of prices in the model to 8 months, our inference on k remains roughly
the same: a longer duration leads to a higher menu cost, conditional on changing the price, but since
price changes occur less frequently, the average menu cost remains roughly the same magnitude.
A similar logic applies if we lower the average duration of prices to 2 months. Note that, even if
changing the frequency of prices adjustment leaves the inferred level of k roughly constant, these
28changes in frequency have a large direct impact on the response of the aggregate price level to a
nominal shock.
Next, we vary the calibration targets for the magnitudes of price changes, the variability of
share changes, and the correlation between price and share changes. We consider a spectrum of
targets that one could possibly support based on changes in the measurement of the data moments,
as reported for example in Table 2. The correlation between prices and market shares (we consider
ar a n g eb e t w e e n−0.4 and 0)m a i n l ya ﬀects the inferred magnitude of cost and demand shocks,
but has little eﬀect on inferred k. Increasing the volatility of shares from 25% to 40% raises the
inferred value of θ and α, but also keeps the inferred k roughly equal. On the other hand, the
magnitude of price changes does aﬀect the inferred level of k: Increasing the average magnitude of
price changes to 15% reduces the inferred upper bound of k from 0.6 to 0.5 (under γ =0 ), and
lowering the average magnitude of price changes to 5% increases the inferred level of k as far as
0.78. Note, however, that such small average price changes are much lower than what is suggested
by our data and other comprehensive product-level datasets on prices. Overall, we conclude that it
is diﬃcult to support ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities that are much higher than k =0 .6 based
on our data and inference procedure.
These results also suggest that if we had targeted the moments of the data that do not exclude
temporary price markups (reported in Tables 1 and 2), our inferred ﬁrm-level pricing complemen-
tarities would be even smaller, since prices and market shares are more volatile if we include sales.
By ﬁltering out sales, we thus also err on the side of caution with regards to our conclusion that
ﬁrm level complementarities appear to be relatively weak.
We also conduct some sensitivity analysis with regards to the persistence parameters ρa and ρz,
reported in Table 8. We can see that changes in the persistence of idiosyncratic shocks have little
eﬀect on our inference of pricing complementarities. Hence, bringing additional information on
the autocorrelation of prices and market shares to guide the choice of these persistence parameters
would most likely not have a major eﬀect on our results.
The Role of Quantity Data: Next, we explore the role of the data on quantities for our
inference strategy and results. This is important, since the pricing facts are much better studied,
and have been observed over much broader datasets such as the CPI data, whereas our facts on
quantities are based on the Dominick’s data.
For this purpose, we recalibrate our benchmark model using price data only. We ﬁx α ∈ (0,1) at
diﬀerent levels, and calibrate the other parameters to match the frequency and magnitude of price
changes (as before), the relative magnitude of increases vs. decreases, and the relative frequency of
29changes conditional on the current price being above or below the mean. We then compare how well
the diﬀerent calibrations match the remaining moments, in order to examine how our conclusions
rely on information on market shares. Results are reported in Columns 1-8 of Table 9.
For α ≤ 0.75, the inferred magnitude of the menu cost is roughly constant at 1%,w h i c hi sc l o s e
to our target. This suggests that the information about menu costs is not suﬃcient to diﬀerentiate
between these diﬀerent values of α. However, over the same set of calibrations, the inferred degree
of ﬁrm-level pricing complementarity remains between 0.52 and 0.6;w i t hγ =0 .85, k is bounded
above by 0.85. Hence, while the precise conﬁguration of α and θ is not identiﬁed on the basis of
price data only, we can infer an upper bound for k that is very similar to the one we obtained in
our benchmark calibration.
The market share moments can then be used as additional targets to separately infer θ and α.
Market shares are more volatile, and the eﬀect of share levels on the probability of price changes
much larger, when α is closer to 1. As in the main calibration, a value of α =0 .55 exactly matches
these two moments; higher values of α imply share movements that are too large and generate too
much asymmetry between high and low shares, whereas lower values of α generate share movements
that are too small and not suﬃciently asymmetric.
In summary, our general conclusion about the magnitude of ﬁrm-level pricing complementarities
does not rely heavily on our market share data; our inference on α and θ, however, does. Separately
inferring α and θ leads to a more precise evaluation of the overall degree of pricing complementarities
if γ>0.
As a further check, we also considered a version of our model in which prices are set before the
realization of idiosyncratic demand shocks, and after the realization of cost shocks. Even though
this modiﬁed model does not account for the observed contemporaneous comovements between
prices and market shares, when following the calibration procedure discussed in this section and
target the two asymmetries, the inferred level of pricing complementarities is very similar to the
one obtained in the benchmark model.
Alternative Shock Distributions and Small Price Changes: As discussed in detail in
Midrigan (2006), the distribution of price changes in the Dominick’s data has fat tails, and almost
30% of all price changes are small in magnitude, i.e. less than 50% of the median absolute price
change. Midrigan shows that when accounting for these features, the model produces a smaller
selection eﬀect, and hence stronger real output eﬀects from nominal shocks. We now consider the
following modiﬁcation of our model to account for these two additional price facts, and examine
whether they aﬀect our inference results on the degree of pricing complementarities.
30To generate small price changes, we embed a simple time-dependent component into the pricing
decisions by assuming that in each period, there is a probability q that ﬁrms get to change their
price for free. We choose q to match the fraction of small price changes. To generate fat tails in
price changes, we assume that cost and demand shocks are both AR1 processes whose innovations
follow a Beta distribution. Speciﬁcally, we assume that cost shocks zit follow





it with probability 1/2
−σzεz
it with probability 1/2
,
where εz
it is drawn from a Beta distribution β (0.05;1.3). Idiosyncratic demand shocks follow an
analogous random process. The parameters of the Beta distribution are the same as those used by
Midrigan (2006). They imply a higher kurtosis of price changes, consistent with the Dominick’s
data.
The results from the modiﬁed model are reported in Columns 9-13 of Table 9. As before, we ﬁx
α, and calibrate the other four parameters F, θ, σa and σz to match our four benchmark moments
on prices and market shares. Our calibration leads to a slightly higher inferred level of pricing
complementarities (the upper bound is 0.65 instead of 0.6), that is accounted for by a lower level
of α. Hence, the model can match the observed frequency of price changes at low values of α,w i t h
a slightly lower level of menu costs than in the benchmark model. To understand this result, note
that the fat-tailed distribution reduces the role of the returns to scale parameter on the ﬁrms’ desire
to change prices (for example, if idiosyncratic shocks are either zero or large in absolute value, price
changes occur only if non-zero shocks occur, for a broad range of parameter values for α and F).
These eﬀects have only a small impact on our inferred level of k,e v e nw i t hah i g hl e v e lo fk u r t o s i s
in the shocks.
The aggregate eﬀects of nominal shocks in the modiﬁed model are more persistent: the Cumu-
lative Impulse Response increases from 1.2 in our benchmark model, to 5.3 in the modiﬁed model,
if γ =0 ,a n df r o m2.3 to 9,i fγ =0 .85.
We conclude that accounting for these two additional price facts has only a minimal eﬀect on
the inferred degree of pricing complementarities, but the model generates stronger output eﬀects
due to a reduction of the extensive margin of price adjustment.
8C o n c l u s i o n
In sticky price models, pricing complementarities play an important role in determining the real
eﬀects of a monetary disturbance. In this paper, we have evaluated the quantitative importance
31of one type of pricing complementarities, based on upwards-sloping marginal costs, in a menu cost
model with idiosyncratic cost and demand shocks that is designed to match features of the micro
data on prices and quantities at the level of individual products. Given that the parameters deter-
mining the response to idiosyncratic shocks also shape the aggregate response to nominal spending
shocks, the model’s ability to match micro data provides an additional degree of discipline over
evaluations that are based solely on aggregate data. Our results suggest that ﬁrm-level comple-
mentarities that are consistent with the micro data are unable, on their own, to generate large
aggregate eﬀects.
That said, there are several important caveats to our approach and results, in addition to the
robustness checks and extensions that we have already discussed. First, our calibration abstracts
from sector-level or aggregate shocks. Our data, however, suggest that these shocks may be fairly
large and induce important ﬂuctuations in sectorial price and spending levels. To the extent that
sectoral shocks add to the ﬁrms’ desire to change prices, we conjecture that they would only
reinforce our conclusions, since our calibration would then require larger menu costs and imply
weaker pricing complementarities to match the data moments on prices and shares.17
Second, we had to rely on price-quantity data from a very small and highly speciﬁcs e to f
goods to draw inference on important aggregate questions. This raises the obvious question of how
representative our data is of the aggregate economy. While an adequate answer to this question
requires similar data sources from other sectors, the calibration that matches only the pricing facts
(Table 9) lends some support to our main conclusion rejecting stronger pricing complementarities.
To us this is reassuring, since the pricing facts are observed across a much wider set of data
(including the BLS data for the consumer price index), and can therefore be expected to be much
more representative of the aggregate economy.
Third, we have focused on one speciﬁc form of pricing complementarities at the ﬁrm level, which
is based on increasing marginal costs at the level of individual varieties, and we have abstracted
from complementarities resulting from variation in desired mark-ups (such as Kimball, 1995, or
more recently, Klenow and Willis, 2006). We believe that some of our insights extend to those
types of complementarities, but it remains an open question whether they will signiﬁcantly change
our quantitative results.
Finally, by taking a very simpliﬁed view of the ﬁrm’s price-setting problem, we have abstracted
17In addition, aggregate ﬂuctuations in prices, costs, or spending, as well as measures of synchronization of price
changes, may also be useful for more direct ways of inferring pricing complementarities, which would complement the
approach we have explored in this paper (see, for example, Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon 2007).
32from important characteristics of the micro data, such as inventories and stock-outs, price promo-
tions, a richer market structure and demand systems, and interactions between wholesalers and
retailers. Future work will have to assess how these channels aﬀect the ﬁrms’ pricing decisions at
the micro level, as well as aggregate dynamics. In this respect, our approach is not designed to
capture all these features of the micro data, but to provide a methodology to assess their aggregate
implications within the context of a tractable macroeconomic model.
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9A p p e n d i c e s
Construction of descriptive statistics
We index weeks by w, product categories by i,U P C ’ sb yj,a n ds t o r e sb yk.W e c o n s t r u c t
market shares, e
ij
kw, as the ratio of sales of UPC (i,j) in store k and week w, to total sales across
all UPCs within product category i in store k and week w. Similarly, we construct relative prices
p
ij
kw as the ratio of the nominal price P
ij
kw of UPC (i,j)i ns t o r ek in week w to the aggregate
price Pi
kw of product category i in store k in week w (product category prices Pi
kw are averages
of individual price levels using store k, week w market shares as weights). We also construct an
indicator variable x
ij
kw of temporary price mark-downs, deﬁned as a price reduction that is reversed








kw00, w0 <w ,
w00 >w , for at least one pair {w0,w00} such that w00 − w0 ∈ {2,3,4,5,6},a n dx
ij
kw =0otherwise.18
We aggregate the data across weeks and stores as follows. We deﬁne time periods as T-week
intervals, and we index periods by t.T h a ti s ,p e r i o dt =1includes weeks w =1 ,...,T,p e r i o dt =2
includes weeks w = T +1,...,2T, and so forth. We aggregate the data on relative prices and market
shares by taking simple averages across stores and weeks within a T week time period. For each
time period, we then exclude UPC for which we do not observe at least 4 consecutive periods
with positive market shares before and after the current period.19 The resulting relative prices




t (note that these measures do not have a store subindex k).
We report separately summary statistics that include and exclude temporary price markdowns,
where the latter are computed using only observations with x
ij
kw =0 . We also report the summary
statistics of the data if we use weighted averages instead of simple averages across stores and weeks,
if we focus on data for only one store (the one with the lowest number of missing observations),
and if we separately consider price and market share changes across all individual stores for each
UPC (rather than constructing one chain-level price and market share for each individual UPC).
18The V pattern that we use to construct a sales indicator is closely related to the deﬁnition of "ﬁlter B" in
Nakamura and Steinsson (2006b). It is more restrictive than that in Midrigan (2006), who does not impose price
reductions to return to their original level when deﬁning a sale.
19Our summary statistics are roughly unchanged if we do not ﬁlter out UPCs with a minimum number of consecutive
periods with positive sales.
36For our statistics on changes in chain-wide price levels, we do not calculate an average price
across weeks and stores — doing this would deliver artiﬁcially high price ﬂexibility as simple price
averages would reﬂect changes in only a subset of (some) individual store/week prices. Instead, we
measure the median price set by Dominick’s across stores (within the medium pricing zone) for each
UPC in a given time period. If we observe more than one price observation per time period when
T>1, we use the price observation corresponding to the ﬁrst available week. In the calculations
that exclude temporary price mark-downs, we remove price observations with x
ij
kw =1 .
Our baseline statistics are constructed using 4 week time periods (T =4 )–t h et i m el e n g t h
of a period in the calibration of our model, and abstracting from UPC/periods with market shares
that are suﬃciently small (i.e. 0.1%). We discuss how the results change if the moments of the
data are constructed in alternative ways.
Approximation of aggregate response to nominal shock
H e r e ,w ed e r i v ea n db r i e ﬂy discuss the approximation formula for the response of prices on
impact that we used in Section 6. We approximate the optimal pricing strategies by logp∗
t (s)=




, log ¯ pt (s) ≈ ¯ K (s)+l o gp∗
t (s),a n dlogpt (s) ≈ K (s)+l o gp∗
t (s),w h e r e




denotes the steady-state front-loading factor, and K (s)=
logp(s) − logp∗ (s) and ¯ K (s)=l o g¯ p(s) − logp∗ (s) denote the steady-state Ss-bands, in terms of
deviation from the target. When computing the aggregate response of our model to a change in
money growth in Section 6, we also follow this approximation.




, and the approximated target
price logp∗
t (s) and Ss-bands log ¯ pt (s) and logpt (s) all increase by the same magnitude δ,i nt h e
initial period of impact of a shock to nominal spending (relative to the counterfactual with steady-
state inﬂation). As a function of δ, the response of prices on impact (net of steady-state inﬂation)
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(logp∗ (s) − log ˆ p)φ(ˆ p;s)dˆ pds
we can rearrange the above expression to that for a small δ, the response of prices on impact (in
logs, and net of steady-state inﬂation) is approximated by
∆logP ≈ δ (f + S)
37() s p
* ln
() s p, φ
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Figure 6: Intensive and Extensive Margins of Adjustment





















that δ = k∆logP +(1− k)∆,w h e r e∆ denotes




(1 − k)(f + S)








1 − (f + S)
1 − k(f + S)
.
f is the frequency of adjustment, which measures the intensive margin: all ﬁrms that would
have change their price prior to the shock raise their new price by an amount δ. S measures the
extensive margin: some ﬁrms that prior to the shock decided to lower their price now prefer to
keep it constant (ﬁrst term), their density is given by the steady-state density φ(¯ p(s);s),t i m e st h e
magnitude of the shift in the upper Ss band, δ, and these ﬁrms would have lowered their price by
an amount ¯ K (s). By the same logic, the second term captures all the ﬁrms who originally chose
to keep their price ﬁxed, but now prefer to increase it. On average, they raise their price by an
amount K (s).T h i si si l l u s t r a t e di nF i g u r e6 .
Figure 7 illustrates the frequency and selection eﬀects for small δ. Integrating over all s,t h e
red areas in the tails measures the frequency or intensive margin, and the blue rectangles measure
the selection eﬀect or extensive margin. The magnitude of this selection eﬀect is inversely related
to the thickness of the tails of φ: for a given frequency f, fatter tails imply that the density is
lower at the Ss-bands p(s) and ¯ p(s), and a given magnitude of price changes can be sustained
only if the Ss-bands are closer to the target price. Both contribute to reducing the size of the blue
rectangles. The white area measures the residual. When k =0 , this exactly corresponds to the real
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Figure 7: Frequency and Selection Eﬀect
eﬀect of the nominal shock on impact. When instead k>0,t h er e a le ﬀect is rescaled by a factor
1/(1−k(f +s)), to take into account that a nominal shock of size ∆ shifts the ﬁrm’s Ss-bands (and
hence optimal prices) only by δ, which scales up the resulting output eﬀect.20
20This graph also recovers the neutrality result of Caplin and Spulber (1987) as an extreme case. If the density




, the white area disappears,
so that the nominal shock has no real eﬀects. In this case, f and S satisfy f =1−
R
s0 ˆ φ
R log ¯ p(s)




log ¯ p(s) − logp(s)




log ¯ K (s) − logK (s)




log ¯ p(s) − logp(s)
¤ ˆ φds.
39                           Table 1: Prices and Market Shares, Dominiks Data, Baseline Statistics
          4 week periods (T=4)
Excluding Including
markdowns markdowns
A - Frequency of price adjustment
1      Frequency 0.26 0.41
B - Magnitude of price changes
2      Mean absolute value 0.11 0.13
3      Standard deviation of non-zero changes 0.15 0.19
4      Standard deviation of relative price changes  0.07 0.09
C - Magnitude of share changes
5      Mean absolute value of log share changes 0.17 0.23
6      Standard deviation of log share changes 0.24 0.31
7      Standard deviation of log share changes for zero-price changes 0.22 0.29
D - Comovement of price and share changes
8      Fraction of prices and log share changes of equal sign 0.45 0.40
9      Correlation of price and log share changes -0.08 -0.17
10      Correlation of price and log share changes for non-zero price changes -0.11 -0.22
11      Correlation of relative price and log share changes -0.23 -0.36
12      Correlation of relative price and log share changes for non-zero price changes -0.20 -0.33
F - Price Increases vs. Decreases
13       Fraction of price increases 0.60 0.54
14       Size of price increases relative to decreases 0.86 0.92
G - High vs. Low Relative Prices
15       Frequency of high relative to low prices 0.97 0.90
H - High vs. Low Shares
16       Frequency of high relative to low shares 1.22 1.17        Table 2: Prices and Market Shares, Dominiks Data, Robustness Analysis
   One week periods           One store Minimum share = 1%   Weighted averages Compute stats across
           (T=1)   (least missing obs.) stores
Excl. Incl.  Excl. Incl.  Excl. Incl.  Excl. Incl.  Excl. Incl. 
mkdowns mkdowns mkdowns mkdowns mkdowns mkdowns mkdowns mkdowns mkdowns mkdowns
A - Frequency of price adjustment
1      Frequency 0.13 0.24 0.18 0.38 0.28 0.43 0.24 0.41 0.16 0.43
B - Magnitude of price changes
2      Mean absolute value 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.14
3      Standard deviation of non-zero changes 0.16 0.21 0.10 0.17 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.12 0.18
4      Standard deviation of relative price changes  0.10 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.10
C - Magnitude of share changes
5      Mean absolute value of log share changes 0.23 0.26 0.33 0.35 0.16 0.23 0.39 0.28 0.35 0.39
6      Standard deviation of log share changes 0.35 0.38 0.43 0.45 0.23 0.30 0.53 0.39 0.46 0.50
7      Standard deviation of log share changes 0.28 0.27 0.41 0.44 0.21 0.27 0.49 0.36 0.45 0.49
          for zero-price changes
D - Comovement of price and share changes
8      Fraction of prices and log share changes of equal sign 0.42 0.27 0.47 0.41 0.44 0.39 0.59 0.39 0.47 0.42
9      Correlation of price and log share changes -0.13 -0.35 -0.05 -0.14 -0.12 -0.18 0.11 -0.17 -0.04 -0.15
10      Correlation of price and log share changes -0.21 -0.44 -0.10 -0.21 -0.17 -0.23 0.18 -0.24 -0.10 -0.20
           for non-zero price changes
11      Correlation of relative price and log share changes -0.25 -0.45 -0.12 -0.27 -0.25 -0.37 -0.03 -0.40 -0.10 -0.25
12      Correlation of relative price and log share changes -0.29 -0.47 -0.13 -0.28 -0.23 -0.36 0.04 -0.39 -0.13 -0.25
           for non-zero price changes
F - Price Increases vs. Decreases
13       Fraction of price increases 0.55 0.53 0.62 0.53 0.59 0.54 0.61 0.55 0.65 0.54
14       Size of price increases relative to decreases 0.88 0.94 0.84 0.92 0.86 0.95 0.85 0.92 0.80 0.92
G - High vs. Low Relative Prices
15       Frequency of high relative to low prices 0.86 0.95 0.87 0.86 0.99 0.93 0.98 0.88 0.93 0.92
H - High vs. Low Shares
16       Frequency of high relative to low shares 1.36 1.54 1.18 1.14 1.21 1.13 0.81 1.18 1.13 1.15Table 3: Baseline model, Steady State, Cost and Demand shocks only
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Target Cost shocks only Demand shocks only
Parameters
1 Returns to scale ,  0.99 0.95 0.75 0.55 0.35 0.95 0.75 0.55 0.35
2 Elasticity of substitution,  6.10 5.85 6.29 6.30 5.90 1.20 1.25 2.90 4.30
3 Standard deviation cost shocks,  0.06 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 Standard deviation demand shocks,  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.30
5 Average menu costs (% SS revenue) < 1 % 0.17% 0.63% 0.82% 1.86% 5.13% 0.00% 0.02% 0.22% 0.87%
6      Firm based pricing complementarities k 0.05 0.20 0.57 0.70 0.76 0.01 0.06 0.46 0.68
Basic steady state implications
7 Frequency of price adjustment (4 weeks) 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.22
8 Mean absolute price change, 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.11 0.10
     non-zero price changes
9 Standard deviation share change 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.26
10 Correlation of price and share changes, -0.2 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 0.93 0.93 0.81 0.60
     non-zero price changes
Other steady state implications
11 Size of price increases relative to decreases 0.85 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.80 1.01 0.95 0.89 0.79
12 Frequency of high relative to low prices 0.95 0.78 0.64 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.79 1.19 1.19 1.07





  0                                                 Table 4: Baseline model, Steady State, Cost and Demand shocks combined
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Target Cost and demand shocks combined
Parameters
1 Returns to scale ,  0.99 0.95 0.75 0.65 0.55 0.35 0.25
2 Elasticity of substitution,  1.55 2.18 3.83 4.20 4.40 4.59 4.64
3 Standard deviation cost shocks,  0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11
4 Standard deviation demand shocks,  0.21 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25
5 Average menu costs (% SS revenue) < 1 % 0.05% 0.11% 0.54% 0.84% 1.31% 2.72% 3.84%
6    Firm based pricing complementarities k 0.01 0.06 0.41 0.53 0.60 0.70 0.73
Basic steady state implications
7 Frequency of price adjustment (4 weeks) 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
8 Mean absolute price change, 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
     non-zero price changes
9 Standard deviation share change 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23
10 Correlation of price and share changes, -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 -0.22 -0.21 -0.20 -0.20 -0.21
     non-zero price changes
Other steady state implications
11 Size of price increases relative to decreases 0.85 0.99 0.98 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.80 0.75
12 Frequency of high relative to low prices 0.95 0.87 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.96





  0Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis to Model Parameters
Parameters and steady state implications Duration = 2 months Duration = 8 months
1 Returns to scale ,  0.95 0.75 0.55 0.35 0.95 0.75 0.55 0.35
2 Firm based pricing complementarities k 0.05 0.38 0.64 0.73 0.05 0.40 0.61 0.71
3 Average menu costs (% SS revenue) 0.08% 0.38% 1.27% 3.16% 0.10% 0.42% 1.04% 2.53%
4 Size of price increases relative to decreases 0.99 0.96 0.92 0.88 1.00 0.92 0.89 0.81
5 Frequency of high relative to low prices 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.95
Parameters and steady state implications Correlation of price, share changes = 0 Correl. of price, share changes = -0.4
6 Returns to scale ,  0.95 0.75 0.55 0.35 0.95 0.75 0.55 0.35
7 Firm based pricing complementarities k 0.04 0.40 0.60 0.70 0.07 0.42 0.64 0.72
8 Average menu costs (% SS revenue) 0.06% 0.46% 1.21% 2.69% 0.14% 0.52% 1.49% 3.27%
9 Size of price increases relative to decreases 0.99 0.91 0.86 0.80 0.97 0.92 0.86 0.79
10 Frequency of high relative to low prices 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91
Parameters and steady state implications Mean absolute price change = 0.05 Mean absolute price change = 0.15
11 Returns to scale ,  0.95 0.75 0.55 0.35 0.95 0.75 0.55 0.35
12 Firm based pricing complementarities k 0.15 0.69 0.78 0.85 0.03 0.27 0.47 0.62
13 Average menu costs (% SS revenue) 0.08% 0.52% 1.36% 3.49% 0.12% 0.50% 1.28% 3.12%
14 Size of price increases relative to decreases 0.95 0.85 0.82 0.74 0.97 0.92 0.87 0.79
15 Frequency of high relative to low prices 0.72 0.68 0.73 0.71 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.96
Parameters and steady state implications Standard deviation share change = 0.4
16 Returns to scale ,  0.99 0.75 0.55 0.35
17 Firm based pricing complementarities k 0.01 0.56 0.74 0.81
18 Average menu costs (% SS revenue) 0.08% 1.22% 3.27% 6.68%
19 Size of price increases relative to decreases 0.99 0.85 0.78 0.70








  0                                      Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis to Model Parameters (Autocorrelation of Idiosyncratic Shocks)
Parameters and steady state implications
1 Returns to scale ,  0.95 0.75 0.55 0.35 0.95 0.75 0.55 0.35
2 Firm based pricing complementarities k 0.05 0.36 0.59 0.67 0.06 0.39 0.61 0.72
3 Average menu costs (% SS revenue) 0.10% 0.38% 1.02% 2.20% 0.09% 0.41% 1.22% 2.84%
4 Size of price increases relative to decreases 0.98 0.93 0.87 0.81 0.97 0.90 0.85 0.79
5 Frequency of high relative to low prices 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.02
Parameters and steady state implications
6 Returns to scale ,  0.95 0.75 0.55 0.35 0.95 0.75 0.55 0.35
7 Firm based pricing complementarities k 0.05 0.39 0.59 0.72 0.06 0.44 0.63 0.74
8 Average menu costs (% SS revenue) 0.10% 0.51% 1.34% 3.04% 0.11% 0.62% 1.55% 3.87%
9 Size of price increases relative to decreases 0.98 0.92 0.87 0.79 0.98 0.90 0.85 0.77
10 Frequency of high relative to low prices 0.88 0.84 0.83 0.85 1.03 1.07 1.09 1.08
 

a  0 , z  0.5 a  0.5 , z  0
a  0.8 , z  0.5 a  0.5 , z  0.8
  0
  0Table 9: Extensions; The Role of Quantity Data, and Matching Additional Pricing Facts
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Target
Parameters       Inference using asymmetries       Beta distribution + small price changes
1 Returns to scale ,  0.95 0.85 0.75 0.65 0.55 0.35 0.25 0.95 0.75 0.65 0.55 0.35
2 Elasticity of substitution,  8.00 6.20 5.25 5.00 4.45 3.20 2.50 1.98 4.06 4.50 5.06 5.97
3 Standard deviation cost shocks,  0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.41 0.52 0.65 0.75 0.82
4 Standard deviation demand shocks,  1.00 0.50 0.37 0.30 0.26 0.17 0.13 1.72 1.93 2.10 2.27 2.47
5 Average menu costs (% SS revenue) < 1 % 0.69% 0.90% 0.96% 1.04% 1.29% 1.16% 1.10% 0.04% 0.37% 0.68% 1.17% 2.69%
6 Probability of zero menu-cost, q  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
7    Firm based pricing complementarities k 0.26 0.44 0.52 0.58 0.61 0.59 0.53 0.05 0.43 0.55 0.65 0.76
Basic steady state implications
8 Frequency of price adjustment (4 weeks) 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22
9 Mean absolute price change, 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
     non-zero price changes
10 Standard deviation share change 0.25 1.10 0.52 0.37 0.29 0.26 0.16 0.13 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25
11 Correlation of price and share changes, -0.20 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.16 -0.02 -0.10 -0.19 -0.20 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21
     non-zero price changes
12 Fraction of prices changes smaller than 5% 0.30  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.30
Other steady state implications
13 Size of price increases relative to decreases 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.79
14 Frequency of high relative to low prices 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.95 0.93 0.81
15 Frequency of high relative to low shares 1.20 1.79 1.41 1.30 1.25 1.23 1.17 1.15 1.09 1.15 1.09 1.12 1.14

a
z

  0